CEO power, corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorHemdan, Dalia Ali Mostafa
dc.contributor.authorSaif-Ur-rehman
dc.contributor.authorKhan, Faisal
dc.date2023
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-09T15:13:10Z
dc.date.available2023-10-09T15:13:10Z
dc.date.issued2023-06-22
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigated the determinants of the firm’s earnings quality (FREQ) using panel data of Egyptian listed firms to address the concerns of endogeneity and heterogeneity. We found that CEO power dynamics negatively impact FREQ. Furthermore, corporate governance’s weakening or substitution role is investigated for the negative association between CEO power dynamics and FREQ. Our findings showed that board-independence significantly weakens the impacts of CEO-ownership and CEO-tenure on FREQ. In contrast, the results fail to support the weakening or substitution role of board-independence for the negative effects of CEO-duality and CEO-political connection on FREQ. Board gender diversity is not significantly associated with FREQ. However, we found that the presence of gender critical mass serves as a substitution mechanism for the negative association between CEO power dynamics and FREQ. Lastly, we observed strong robustness for our primary analysis through propensity matching scores and difference-in-different (DID) techniques. This study brings a novelty to existing research by exploring the negative consequences of CEO power dynamics. Furthermore, it provides an insight into the constraining or weakening of the role of corporate governance. The main findings of the current study are also robust to Modified Jones model (1995) reverse-causality, DID and propensity-matching techniques. © Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2023.
dc.identifier.citationHemdan, D. A. M., Saif-Ur-Rehman, & Khan, F. (2023). CEO power, corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting & Finance, 19(1), 181–225. https://doi.org/10.21315/aamjaf2023.19.1.7
dc.identifier.issn18234992
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.21315/aamjaf2023.19.1.7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12519/888
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherPenerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAsian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance; Volume 19, Issue 1
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
dc.rights.holderCopyright : © Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2023.
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectBoard-independence
dc.subjectCEO-duality
dc.subjectCEO-ownership
dc.subjectCEO-political connection
dc.subjectCEO-tenure
dc.subjectGender critical mass
dc.subjectGender diversity
dc.titleCEO power, corporate governance mechanisms and earnings quality
dc.typeArticle

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Access Instruction 888.pdf
Size:
108.02 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download

Collections

Accounting & Finance