CEO Greed and Firms' Environmental Performance in Environmentally Sensitive Sectors of China
In the current study, the authors explored how CEO greed concerning bonuses and rewards on restricted stock affects a firm's environmental performance (EP) in environmentally sensitive sectors of China. Moreover, they empirically tested the constraining role of the quad director on the relationship between CEO greed and EP. Findings indicate that (a) CEO greed negatively affects the strategic firm's environmental performance, particularly the negative relation is augmented by the person-pay interactionism rationale (bonus), (b) the presence of one quad director in the board does not constrain CEO greed and EP negative relation, and (c) the presence of two or more quad directors in the board significantly constraints the negative relation between CEO greed and EP. Thus, having at least two quad directors is more effective than combining directors with multiple features. Our results are robust to different CEOs' power dynamics. Our research has important practical implications for corporate governance and business strategy formulation. © 2023 IGI Global. All rights reserved.
CEO Greed, China, Corporate Governance, Environmental Performance, Environmentally Sensitive Sectors, Quad Director
Saif-Ur-Rehman, Elshareif, E., & Khan, H. (2023). CEO Greed and Firms' Environmental Performance in Environmentally Sensitive Sectors of China. International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management (IJABIM), 14(1), 1-30. http://doi.org.ezp.cud.ac.ae:2048/10.4018/ijabim.318473